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RENTIER STATEBUILDING IN KOSOVO: LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND THE 
RENTIER ECONOMY  
Nicolas Lemay-Hébert (University of Birmingham and University of Quebec at Montreal) and 
Syed Mansoob Murshed (ISS-Erasmus University and Coventry University) 
 
Abstract: Kosovo has been under various forms of international administration since 1999. 
Although the political dimension of this international experience has been widely studied by 
scholars – especially those associated with the critical theory of liberal peacebuilding – the 
economic dimension of international rule has been given less attention. This article explores this 
dimension by linking insights from the rentier theory with critical approaches to liberal 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. The postulate informing this article is that the sources of income 
for a state have an impact on the state’s institutional development. The article discusses liberal 
peacebuilding through the rentier theory lens, analyses the economic management in the early 
years of the international administration, and describes and explores some of the unintended 
consequences of the massive international presence in Kosovo on the local economy.  
 
Keywords: International administration; Dutch disease; Political economy; Liberal peace; 
Balkans. 
 
Introduction: Trying to Understand the ‘Legitimacy Gap’ 
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)1 has been entrusted 
with the difficult task of administering the war-torn territory of Kosovo following the 1999 
conflict, which saw more than 10,000 casualties attributed to Serbian military or paramilitary 
                                                 
1 UNMIK is divided into four pillars, each originally headed by a different international organization with 
specific roles and responsibilities (UN, 1999). By so doing, the UN Secretariat hoped to increase the 
international organizations’ interoperability on the ground, one of the reported deficiencies of previous 
peacebuilding missions, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dizdarević, 2004: 39). The first pillar was 
dedicated to humanitarian action under the aegis of the UNHCR until June 2000. At the end of what came 
to be called the ‘emergency stage,’ a new Pillar I was established to cover the realm of ‘police and 
justice,’ and then passed to the UN itself. The civil administration component of the mission constitutes 
the second pillar and is directly under the leadership of the UN. Pillar III is the vaguely termed 
‘democratization and institution building’, led by the OSCE. Finally, the European Union has charge of 
the ‘reconstruction and economic development’ pillar. The other international organizations involved in 
the reconstruction and administration of Kosovo, such as WFP, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, work under the coordination of the lead agency for each pillar, and under 
the general coordination of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). 
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forces in Kosovo. Meanwhile, more than 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians were either forcibly 
expelled from their homes or decided to flee the conflict, representing some 90 per cent of the 
estimated Kosovar Albanian population in 1998. The level of infrastructural and institutional 
destruction in Kosovo added to the political wrangling over the final status of the territory and 
continuing inter-community tensions, and provided the United Nations and leading Western 
governments with a perfect legitimate excuse to preclude any immediate transfer of authority to 
indigenous authorities and to authorize an international administration that would regulate all 
aspects of the everyday life of Kosovars (Lemay-Hébert, 2011b and 2012). Hence, the Security 
Council mandated UNMIK to administer ‘temporarily’ the territory of Kosovo, in the process 
conferring on the UN administration executive, legislative and judicial powers over the territory. 
More than sixteen years after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244 establishing 
UNMIK, the UN is still de jure administrating Kosovo, even if it jump-started the process of 
handover to local institutions in 2004 and the European Union has taken over most of the 
supervisory responsibilities since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. 
 
Despite being welcomed wholeheartedly by the local population in the immediate aftermath of 
the conflict, the relationship between UNMIK and Kosovars quickly soured. In fact, from the first 
Early Warning reports (conducted in 2002 by USAID and UNDP) to the present day, UNMIK 
has been one of the most unpopular political institutions in Kosovo, with the exception of the 
winter of 2006, when the provisional institutions of self-government (PISG) were held 
responsible for a delay in negotiations.2 In other words, UNMIK fundamentally lost the struggle 
for hearts and minds in Kosovo. In the words of Anthony Welch, Coordinator of the International 
Security Sector Review for Kosovo, UNMIK simply ‘failed to command the respect of the local 
population’ (2006: 225; see also ICG, 1999). After 2004, the level of satisfaction with UNMIK 
action was so low that, as put by King and Mason, who had worked for UNMIK: ‘If UNMIK had 
been up for election, it would have needed to campaign hard to win votes from anybody in 
Kosovo other than its own staff’ (2006: 220). The Secretary-General subsequently dispatched a 
Norwegian diplomat, Ambassador Kai Eide, to conduct a comprehensive review of the policies 
and practices of all actors in Kosovo. The conclusion of the first Eide report was clear: there 
                                                 
2 See Early Warning Reports and the Public Pulse Reports, available online at: 
http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library.html (accessed 10 June 2015) 
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should be an ambitious policy of transfer of authority to the institutions of Kosovo, coupled with 
a restructuring of UNMIK (UN, 2004: 3–5). As Ambassador Eide further noted in a second 
report, ‘while standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven, the time has come to move 
to the next phase of the political process’ (UN, 2005). Hence, it was clear that ‘after 
administering Kosovo for six years and four months, the UN accepted that its usefulness had 
come to an end’ (King and Mason, 2006: vii). Martti Ahtisaari, appointed Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, built extensively on Eide’s assessment and in 2007, 
after fruitless negotiations between Serbian and Kosovar representatives, recommended 
‘independence, supervised by the international community’ for Kosovo (UN, 2007). Hence, as 
Tim Judah states, ‘the years of the UN protectorate looked as though they were giving way to 
those of something new: an EU protectorate, at least in those areas where Albanians lived’ (2008: 
116). 
 
Many authors have explored the political hurdles of governing Kosovo through an international 
administration (Caplan, 2005; Hehir, 2009; Lemay-Hébert, 2011a and 2013; Narten 2008; 
Visoka, 2011; Yannis, 2004). Most of these analyses fall into the wider frame of the critique of 
the liberal peace paradigm as the dominant form of externally supported peacebuilding 
(Chandler, 2006; Cooper, 2007; Duffield, 2007; Joshi et al. 2014; Richmond, 2005). The liberal 
peace refers here to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful, both in 
their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than ‘illiberal’ states. Hence, liberal 
peacebuilding implies not just managing instability between states – the traditional focus of the 
IR discipline – but also building peace within states on the basis of liberal democracy and market 
economics (Newman et al., 2009: 7). The liberal peace encompasses socio-cultural norms 
associated with peacemaking, as well as the international and national structures instrumental to 
promoting the liberal peace. Economic considerations are also central to the model, for liberal 
peacebuilding implies ‘the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance – liberal 
market democracy – from the core to the periphery of the international system’ (Paris, 2002: 638; 
see also Duffield, 2001; Pugh et al., 2008). 
 
While keeping in mind the aforementioned legitimacy gap, this article analyses certain oft-
neglected economic themes in the statebuilding and peacebuilding literature, all related to the 
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international governance of Kosovo in the first decade following the 1999 war, and hints at an 
alternative research agenda. While there has been much critical debate about liberal 
peacebuilding in the last decade, leading to innovative conceptualizations of the limits of the 
external imposition of political institutions on so-called fragile or weak states (Grimm et al., 
2014), critical scholars have recently been challenged to develop ‘sharper theoretical tools to 
understand and explain the complex empirical cases that are thrown up by the liberal peace’ 
(Heathershaw, 2013: 275; see also Zaum, 2012). This article tries to contribute to this new wave 
of theorization by explicitly drawing from rentier state theory in economics and the impact of 
external inflows, exploring ‘the patterns of development and the nature of states in economies 
dominated by external rent’ (Mahdavy, 1970: 428).3 Hence, Kosovo’s substantial external 
inflows – which amounted to a process of rentier statebuilding4 – have had far-reaching 
consequences for the nascent state, beyond conventional impacts on sovereignty.  
 
We argue that rentier theory can shed additional light on the travails of liberal peacebuilding and 
statebuilding in Kosovo, especially by linking Kosovo’s sources of income with the state’s 
institutional development, and by providing additional insights into the complex relationship 
between the United Nations and Kosovars. Three main themes are specifically addressed in this 
article. First, it explores the specific linkages between the critical approach to liberal 
peacebuilding and rentier state theory, further developing the interplay between these two bodies 
of literature through the concept of rentier statebuilding. Second, the article revisits the claim, 
often made by scholars and practitioners, that external structures such as international 
administrations are an efficient means to govern war-torn territories on a temporary basis (see 
Lemay-Hébert, 2015). Without engaging in the debate surrounding the corruption of international 
officials5 – which can be enlightening when discussing culturalist claims that the ‘culture of 
                                                 
3 Substantial external inflows can also include worker remittances from abroad – something that is not 
strictly ‘rent’, but can have similar consequences, as discussed below. 
4 A concept also developed by Florian Kühn (2010). 
5 The most serious cases of misconduct in Kosovo were: the embezzlement of € 3.9 million of Kosovo 
Energy Corporation (KEK) funds by Joe Trutschler, a senior German official, and € 300,000 by Kosovo 
Trust Agency (KTA) Division Manager, Roger Reynolds; and allegations of corruption by Gerard Fischer, 
who was the Deputy SRSG and signed a contract involving Post and Telecom Kosovo (PTK) without 
going through procurement procedures. Mr Fischer has been arrested but has not faced trial, and has 
accepted another assignment. Recently, an internal report was leaked, revealing that the European Union 
and United Nations have abandoned investigations into serious allegations of fraud and corruption over 
£ 60 million-worth of funding for Kosovo. According to this report, EU funds for economic reconstruction 
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Kosovo’ impedes any significant changes in the region (Aitala, 2008; Cilluffo and Salmoiraghi, 
1999)6 – this article looks at the limits of economic management ‘from the outside-in’ (Lemay-
Hébert, 2009b). It revisits Kosovo’s economic growth data in the post-war years, and looks at the 
difficulties we face in assessing Kosovo’s post-war economic growth. Finally, the article analyses 
the impact of international transfers on the local economy through the specific lens of the rentier 
state and the ‘Dutch disease’ theory, shedding additional light on the complex interplay between 
the economic and political dimensions of international statebuilding.  
 
Liberal Peacebuilding and the Rentier State 
It is now commonly accepted that contemporary attempts at statebuilding avowedly or 
inadvertently deploy policies akin to the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm (see Joshi et al., 2014). Despite 
the common idea, the liberal peace paradigm is here not so much associated with classical liberal 
thinking – which is actually a heterogeneous and diverse scholarship – but instead has closer 
links with the democratic peace theory in international relations.7 The democratic peace theory 
posits the absence of major armed conflict between economically interdependent and democratic 
nations who share membership of common international organizations (Gleditsch, 2008). The 
central mechanism behind the theory is that states that share common values, and/or are mutually 
interdependent, eschew the strategy of war to settle their differences. Different strands of the 
democratic peace theory have emerged over time, each having an impact on the liberal peace 
debate. They include studies on the obsolescence of major wars following a normative evolution 
of mental habits (Mueller, 1988), institutional perspectives, studying the impact of international 
institutions on the behaviour of states (Russett and Oneal, 2001), and economic theses based on 
cost–benefit analyses of conflict (Oneal and Russett, 1999). The liberal peacebuilding paradigm 
is then inspired by these discussions, and in a sense furthers the research agenda to extend it to 
societal cohesion inside state units. Hence, liberal peacebuilding implies not just managing 
instability between states – which is the central focus of the democratic peace theory – but also 
                                                                                                                                                              
to help rebuild a war-shattered Kosovo ten years ago were hit by at least eleven scandals involving twelve 
cases of alleged criminal activity and twenty-seven examples of alleged breaches of rules on the award of 
contracts and nepotism (Buzhala 2006; Waterfield 2009; Zaremba 2007b).  
6 For a non-ideological and culturally sensitive take on Kosovo’s ‘shadow economy’, see the work of 
Michael Pugh (2004).  
7 Which renders the whole argument of how ‘liberal’ the liberal peace is rather moot. For proponents of 
this argument, see Selby (2013).  
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building peace within states on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics. Mirroring 
the democratic peace debate, the liberal peace encompasses socio-cultural norms associated with 
peacemaking, as well as the international and national structures instrumental to promoting the 
liberal peace. Both the democratic peace theory and the liberal peacebuilding discussion are thus 
built on two main assumptions, presented in the literature as inseparable: an economic 
assumption – economic interdependence and exchange reduces the propensity to wage war; and a 
normative assumption – institutions or increased interactions will lead to a growing sense of a 
common polity and values (following a Kantian or Rawlsian approach). This article unearths 
these assumptions embedded in the liberal peace discussions and analyses them in light of the 
literature on the rentier state in Kosovo. 
 
The economic and normative assumptions that trade between nations directly contributes to 
peace within and between societies actually have deep roots, which can be traced back to certain 
segments of the traditional liberal scholarship including, for instance, Baron de Montesquieu’s 
The Spirit of the Laws (1748), where he argues that commerce tends to promote peace between 
nations, mutual self-interest precludes war, and trade softens attitudes of peoples towards each 
other; or in Richard Cobden’s declaration that ‘commerce is the grand panacea’ (1835), by 
which he meant the pacific and civilizing effects of international trade, along with its potential 
for assuaging tensions between nations (see also Paine, 1791–2: 265; or, for a more recent 
iteration of these principles, Angell, 1910). The democratic peace theory was clearly inspired by 
these discussions, and developed its own statistical models to verify these claims. Hegre (2000) 
argued that economic interdependence reinforces peace, but mainly between more developed 
economies, while Russett and Oneal (2001) asserted that it is the economic dependence on trade 
of the least dependent on the other members of a group of nations that will determine the pacific 
effect of trade. Among the most recent updates proposed for the democratic peace theory is the 
‘capitalist’ peace notion of Gartzke (2007), which goes beyond trade dependence. He argues 
that the intensity of trade is the least important feature in the peace engendered by capitalism; in 
fact, the nature of advanced capitalism makes territorial disputes – which are mainly contests 
over resources – less likely as the market mechanism allows easier access to resources. The 
nature of capitalist production makes the output of more sophisticated goods and services 
increasingly reliant on ideas or blueprints that are research-and-development oriented rather 
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than resource intensive, and skilled personnel can be acquired through more open global labour 
markets. Moreover, financial interdependence makes war between those integrated in this 
manner even more costly compared to trade disruptions. 
 
While building (consciously or unconsciously) on this scholarship, liberal peacebuilding shifts 
the focus from interstate collaboration to intrastate cohesion. Hence, here the liberal peace 
refers to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful in their domestic 
dispute resolution compared to ‘illiberal’ states. Economic stagnation, or economic 
development that is very unevenly distributed, can cause the tolerant niceties of an existing 
domestic social contract to fray. Those left behind and the underprivileged may revolt if 
coherently organized and if opportunities present themselves, which can lead to internal 
conflicts and violence. Equally, the relatively rich may choose to prey on the less fortunate if 
they are no longer prepared to subsidize or support these groups. It is important to note that so-
called liberal democracies are not immune from these tendencies; recent history has shown that 
they can very well behave violently towards segments of their societies. Indeed, as has been 
argued, since 1991 developing countries are mostly characterized by imperfect democracies or 
anocracies8 containing elements of democracy (multi-party electoral competition) along with 
some of the more invidious traits of autocracy (no effective checks on the executive, for 
example). Ultimately, as the argument goes, growth and increased economic interaction through 
globalization, as well as rising democratization, are likely to promote peace between and within 
developing countries, mirroring Lipset’s (1960) modernization hypothesis that democracy (and 
peace) inevitably follow economic growth.9 
 
Proponents of liberal statebuilding aim to follow a path similar to that described by Auty and 
Gelb (2001) as ‘benevolent and developmental’, by which they mean that the state actively 
promotes an internationally competitive economy, discouraging in the process rent-seeking 
behaviour. This path, however, is directly challenged when the elite composition of the state 
and the nature of the economy have characteristics and tendencies that turn the state into a 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, the Polity IV project for combined democracy and autocracy scores: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
9 The economic objective of a competitive international economy may be retarded by external constraints 
to economic growth (see Chang, 2003). 
8 
 
rentier or predatory one.10 A rentier state derives a substantial portion of its income from non-
produced sources (Omeje, 2008: 5), and is largely dependent on these external rents and 
inflows. By ‘non-produced income’, we refer to categories of income such as official 
development assistance and worker remittances from abroad that augment national income but 
are not part of domestically produced output. Worker remittances from abroad are not strictly 
‘rent’, but can have similar negative consequences on domestic production by providing 
alternative sources of income based on external inflows. We may add the windfall or Ricardian 
quasi-rent (shortage value) of unusually high natural-resource-related royalties (usually oil) 
during commodity price booms. Thus, ‘rents’ can originate from various sources: natural 
resources (in petro-monarchies, for instance), contrived rent or political manipulation of prices 
(Zimbabwe recently), or foreign aid, also dubbed ‘geopolitical rent’ by Richard Auty (2006: 
37).11 This geopolitical rent can reach 10 to 25 per cent of GDP in developing countries, 
according to figures compiled by Peter Boone (1996). As we shall see below, total external 
inflows in post-war Kosovo have been up to 35 per cent of GDP. One of the principal 
consequences of rents is the distortions induced on actors’ behaviour, in other words the rent-
seeking behaviour of economic agents. 
 
The ideal-typical rentier state is therefore usually associated with weak public institutions, 
political instability, inequitable wealth distribution12, and high levels of corruption, as well as 
resource inflows from abroad (Woolcock et al., 2001: 76). This configuration impacts not only 
the local economy, but also the nature of state–society relations and institutions.13 External 
resources can drive a certain type of exogenous growth, but this comes with a vulnerability to 
external shocks – for instance, the progressive drawdown of international transfers. In a rentier-
state context, national income contains a substantial proportion of non-produced elements: 
                                                 
10 See Verkoren and Kamphuis (2013) for an elaboration on these concepts, with an application to the case 
of Afghanistan.  
11 If rents can come from various sources, they don’t have equal effects. Paul Collier argues that ‘despite 
the bureaucracy, aid has been much more successful than oil’, even if this is a disputed assertion in 
development economics (Collier, 2008: 102).  
12 The inequality of both income and wealth has been rising in the richer Western economies also, see 
Piketty (2014) for example. An argument can be made that these inequalities are in part due to the 
phenomenon of rent rather than a return to capital.  
13 This is a configuration also analysed in the literature on neo-patrimonialism, looking at personalistic and 
clientelistic governance systems marked by high levels of rent-seeking, corruption, waste, 
authoritarianism, arbitrariness and political instability (Kelsall et al. 2010 and references therein). 
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natural-resource revenues or royalties (which are chiefly a gift of nature); foreign aid (in the 
main, a transfer of resources); and remittances sent by nationals working abroad (whose value 
added is to a foreign economy). All three elements can seriously ‘distort’ the structure and 
future growth trajectory of the economy, via a phenomenon known as the Dutch disease (see 
Murshed, 2010). The Dutch disease encompasses a variety of negative impacts on an economy, 
giving rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency. It describes situations in which consumption 
relative to investment is encouraged, where production is skewed away from traded goods 
(agriculture or manufacturing) towards services,14 and in which exports are rendered 
uncompetitive. The original Dutch disease is traditionally linked to the real appreciation of a 
national currency in a context of resource wealth, which undermines the competitiveness of all 
produced economic activities (i.e. excluding services)  (Dauderstädt, 2006: 16). Dutch disease 
effects may also emanate from substantial external assistance or worker remittances from 
abroad. The term was coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe the adverse impact of a 
North Sea gas bonanza on the economy of the Netherlands, and in this context it involves 
commodity exports driving up the value of the currency, making other parts of the economy less 
competitive, leading to a current-account surplus and even greater dependence on natural-
resource exports. Later on, the economic theory of the Dutch disease focused on the negative 
impact of resource booms and external inflows on the long-term growth prospects of the 
economy (Murshed, 2010).  
 
Worker remittances from abroad account for a substantial portion of Kosovo’s GDP, as 
indicated in Table 1. Remittances sent by foreign workers are not strictly speaking a rent, unlike 
aid or certain types of natural-resource-based royalties. Yet they have been argued to reduce 
long-term growth in a cross-country econometric study by Barajas et al. (2009). Worker 
remittances do permit consumption smoothing, and help reduce poverty in poorer countries, but 
they can discourage labour supply and prevent channelizing savings into productive investment 
in countries with poor institutional settings. Moreover, remittances also cause real exchange-
rate appreciation, but that effect may be weaker than with resource rents (Ratha, 2013). Ratha 
also argues that remittances may also encourage private expenditure on health and education, 
                                                 
14 A high share of services in the national income may be characteristic of a mature manufacturing 
economy. Here we refer to a high share of services as a result of windfall external inflows. 
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besides helping to reduce poverty in poor countries. Driffield and Jones (2013) find that 
remittances may promote long-term economic growth in a cross-section of countries, but in a 
setting of good-quality institutions, particularly law and order (property rights and contract 
enforcement). Hence, the presence or absence of negative Dutch disease-type effects of 
substantial remittance inflows may depend on the quality of institutions related to the political 
economy. The cross-country econometric study conducted by Abdih et al. (2008) suggests that 
remittances do have a negative impact on institutional quality, as they allow governments to 
siphon money away for their own purposes, leading to weaker institutional quality in terms of 
corruption, government effectiveness and the rule of law. Scholars have also questioned the 
sustainability of the Kosovar economic model relying too heavily on remittances (Korovilas, 
2010), even if this has probably helped mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 
(Pula, 2014), especially helping to keep consumption poverty down. 
 
In the words of Michael Dauderstädt, one of the negative political-economy effects of the Dutch 
disease can be that ‘the government is not really interested in developing the national economy 
as a tax base because of the availability of rents’ (2006: 16). By contrast, low rents are more 
likely to motivate governments to create wealth as the most practical means of boosting output, 
which can then be taxed to increase revenue (Auty, 2006: 38). In other words, low rents could 
align the incentives of the elite with those of the majority in growing the economy by providing 
public goods and efficiency incentives, whereas high rents incentivize the elite to pursue 
immediate self-enrichment by channelling rent through patronage networks at the expense of 
markets, which distorts the economy (Auty, 2010). 
 
In many ways, the ‘rentier state’ theory is the political economy counterpart of the purely 
economic Dutch disease theory, emphasizing the role of institutions (or governance) in 
promoting or retarding economic progress (see Mavrotas et al., 2011; Mehlum et al., 2006). In 
this sense, both the rentier state and the Dutch disease theories provide a counterpoint to the two 
classical assumptions of the democratic peace theory and the liberal peacebuilding paradigm 
(normative and economic, as discussed earlier). In this literature, abundant resource rents only 
constitute a problem for the economy if economic and political institutions are weak, leading to 
poor governance and corruption. Furthermore, in the context of economies characterized by an 
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abundance of natural-resource rents the combination of Dutch disease and a rentier economy 
contributes to what has been dubbed the ‘resource curse’: economic stagnation and political 
discontent in the midst of plentiful resource rents, which are subjected to elite capture. A 
predatory state goes one step further (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013: 509–11): here, the elite’s 
interest in rent extraction renders them into something akin to the roving bandits described by 
Olson (1996). A roving bandit merely exacts tribute, without nurturing the tax base from which 
the rent is exacted, effectively destroying the economy. By contrast, a stationary bandit attempts 
to expand the very same base by promoting growth, although he is still interested in exacting 
tribute. The appearance of a high volume of resource rents and substantial quantities of overseas 
aid can encourage predation. Rentier or predatory states invalidate most of the liberal 
peacebuilding postulates, since the structure of rentier economies has an adverse impact on the 
political and economic institutions necessary for sustaining democratization and a competitive 
economy, which run counter to the interests of elites in a rentier state, and more so in an even 
more extractive, kleptocratic predatory state.         
 
Hence, we suggest the concept of rentier statebuilding to encapsulate these socio-economic 
dynamics. We concur with Barnett Rubin’s statement that there are definite ‘similarities between 
rentier states based on natural resource extraction and states being built through third-party aid in 
international operations’ (2006: 30–1). A large international presence can disrupt market 
efficiency and have unintended consequences on the social contract binding the government and 
its population. The large international presence creates negative externalities – defined as a 
situation in which an individual or firm (in this context, the peacebuilding operation) makes a 
decision, but does not bear the full cost of the decision, leading to market inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, while external aid is vital to reconstruction and development efforts in post-conflict 
economies characterized by the paucity of private sources of finance, aid dependence may retard 
the development of state capacity and the development of the national economy as a tax base, as 
described in Ghani and Lockhart in the case of Afghanistan (2008; see also Kühn, 2008; Rubin, 
1992; Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013).   
 
Breaking the Spin: Reassessing Kosovo’s Growth Under UNMIK 
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Before addressing the specific nature of the rentier economy in Kosovo and rentier statebuilding 
processes, it is useful to stress the contested nature of the local economy, which led in turn to a 
very political process of the production of statistics in order to bolster the rationale for supporting 
liberal peacebuilding in the region. (For a discussion on the politicized nature of statistical 
production in the ‘fragile states’ context, see Rocha de Siquiera, 2014.) Liberal peacebuilding 
was clearly one of the cornerstones of the international intervention in Kosovo (Pugh, 2005: 26; 
Knudsen, 2013), but the consequences of the international policies did not follow the liberal 
peacebuilding model and instead led to dynamics more akin to rentierism. 
 
In Kosovo, economic policies were determined and implemented directly by international 
officials, at least until the creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in 
2001. One of the local complaints addressed to UNMIK in the early years was about the pace of 
recovery in Kosovo, which had been too slow to meet people’s demands and expectations, and 
which led in turn to growing discontent. This statement directly conflicts with the commonly held 
narrative that international actors are better managers than locals and more to be trusted in a 
context of widespread corruption. As was made clear by UN Assistant Secretary-General and 
Associate Administrator of the UN Development Programme, Ad Melkert, Kosovo was an utter 
shambles immediately before its declaration of independence in February 2008. After a visit to 
Kosovo in 2007, Melkert recognized that ‘the situation in Kosovo can be compared to the 
circumstances in the poorest African countries: an extremely high mortality rate of newborn 
children (35 deaths to 1,000 births), a very high unemployment rate (42 per cent), a poor 
educational system and a severely polluted environment’ (Melkert, 2007). Similarly, for the 
UNICEF, Kosovo was ‘an island of poverty in Europe’ in 2008 (2008: 11). 
 
However, official statistics appeared to show impressive GDP growth in Kosovo, especially in 
the aftermath of the international intervention of 1999, thus strengthening the legitimacy of the 
liberal peacebuilding policies. For instance, economic growth was estimated at 11 per cent in 
2001 and 7 per cent in 2002. On the eve of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, it was widely 
accepted that Kosovo’s estimated GDP had grown by at least a factor of two over the nine-year 
period. However, the key word here is “estimated”. Indeed, official estimates of the size of 
Kosovo’s GDP have been continuously revised downwards. In December 2001, the IMF 
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estimated it at € 1.85 billion, while in June 2003 it put it at € 1.57 billion and, in December 2003, 
UNMIK estimated it at € 1.34 billion (IMF and UNMIK numbers, quoted in Economic Strategy 
and Project Identification Group [ESPIG], 2004: 7). As ESPIG notes: ‘This shows a disturbing 
lack of any reliable statistical base for evaluating the level of activity in Kosovo upon which 
growth figures could be calculated. It also reveals a growing sense of unease among international 
officials about the nature of the post-war economy’ (2004: 7). An explanatory note in IMF 
documents states that ‘all data for Kosovo are estimates’ (see, for instance, IMF, 2007). The IMF 
also clarified that ‘estimates of the size of the economy of Kosovo are based on partial 
information, potentially unreliable observations, and some educated guesswork’ (Corker et al., 
2001: 23). Similarly, USAID noted that it had to rely on ‘a professional’s opinion or conventional 
wisdom’ in some of its reports, specifying that ‘in many cases, [they] were unable to separate fact 
from opinion’ (2005: 1). As the economist Ibrahim Rexhepi states, one has to be very cautious 
with the so-called economic growth of Kosovo: ‘As far as Kosovo is concerned, just one fact 
cannot be put in doubt at the moment: its area equals 10,887 square kilometres. All other data, 
including those concerning the present state of the economy, are not only utterly unreliable, but 
for the most part unknown’ (quoted in European Centre for Minority Issues). For the KIPRED 
institute, a local think-tank, reliable information is ‘Kosovo’s scarcest resource’ (Muharremi et 
al., 2003: 40), while for Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative, ‘public institutions [in 
the European protectorates] are operating in an information vacuum, cut off from the social 
groups they are supposed to serve’ (Knaus 2006: 219). Even if one accepts the international 
economic data, and while keeping in mind that economic data on Kosovo before the conflict were 
to some extent as scant and unreliable as after it (del Castillo, 2008: 138), Kosovo is still far from 
its per capita GDP levels before the economic crisis of the 1980s, and the disastrous decade of the 
1990s (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 6; Palairet, 2001). 
 
This should be kept in mind when considering in retrospect the triumphant press releases of the 
early years of the international administration. This reflects what a former UNMIK official 
termed the mission’s greatest flaw: its propensity to ‘spin information to make it appear that the 
situation in Kosovo is “under control” when this is not the case’ (O’Neill, 2002: 108; see also 
Hehir, 2007: 137). In fact, the UN in Kosovo has gone further than simply spinning the story; a 
confidential study conducted for the German government by the Institute for European Politics 
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and leaked to the media accuses NATO and the UN of creating a culture of systematic repression 
of critical reports in order to present Kosovo as a success story (Pancevski, 2007). This 
propensity to silence contradictory voices emerged from the very beginning of the international 
administration in Kosovo.15  
 
In this context, the development challenges of nascent Kosovo were – and to a certain extent still 
are – daunting, despite the aid that flowed into the territory after 1999.16 Economic reconstruction 
was handled principally through two institutions: the European Agency for Reconstruction and 
the EU pillar of UNMIK, as mentioned earlier. The EU clearly took a liberal and market-oriented 
approach towards economic reconstruction, focusing on privatization and fostering a sound 
economic investment culture for Kosovo. For Andreas Wittkowsky, deputy head of the EU pillar, 
UNMIK was undoubtedly able to put Kosovo’s economy on the right path ‘by introducing basic 
modern market institutions and hard budget constraints’ in a context where there were ‘clear 
limits to what an international protectorate can do to enroot these institutions’. It was, therefore, 
‘unrealistic to expect that such a protectorate [would] leave behind a fully functioning market 
economy’ (Wittkowsky, 2006: 204). As unrealistic as it may seem, according to its own former 
officials UNMIK only managed to forge its strategy in 2003, a fact that hindered ‘UNMIK’s 
ability to forge a viable peace in a reasonable time frame’, which in turn contributed to ‘the lack 
of support for UNMIK by Kosovo’s Serb community and the slow erosion of support among the 
Albanian population’ (Blair et al., 2005: 206). The inability to develop an initial reconstruction 
strategy was compounded by the European Union’s limited experience in post-conflict economic 
reconstruction and difficulty in finding adequate personnel for these tasks (Yannis, 2003: 180). 
 
However disputed the economic growth figures under UNMIK, what is certain is that economic 
policies were clearly not pro-poor and developmental, following in that sense the basics of the 
rentier state theory. According to the IMF: ‘The gains achieved so far not only are fragile but 
have left major developmental challenges largely unaddressed. These include entrenched high 
structural unemployment, a depleted stock of human capital, and dilapidated main public utilities 
                                                 
15 For instance, the UN attempted to shut down a Kosovo Serb radio station on the grounds that it refused 
to air UN messages promoting participation in Kosovar elections. UN sources also mentioned that the 
station was referring to the international presence as an occupying force (Reuters, 2000).  
16 More than € 3.5 billion in international investment has come from international organizations, bilateral 
aid and international NGOs (Skendaj, 2014: 13). 
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and infrastructure’ (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 5). It seems important to mention here that, of all 
the problems plaguing Kosovo, unemployment is certainly one of the most acute. As for the 
‘economic growth’ of the early years of international administration, unemployment numbers are 
also difficult to estimate. As the ESPIG notes, ‘“Unemployment” is an administrative category 
that measures the number of those who are actively looking for work but fail to find it. In 
societies where unemployment status confers benefits, there are clear incentives for people to 
register. In Kosovo, there are no such benefits’ (2004: 9). The generally accepted estimate ranges 
from 30 to 50 per cent (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2010: 5), with an employment rate hovering 
around a desperately low 30 per cent. By contrast, Susan Woodward puts the unemployment rate 
in pre-war Kosovo at 23.1 per cent in 1985 and estimates it at 22.2 per cent by 1990 (1995: 205). 
Moreover, its effects are felt most acutely by children, the elderly, female-headed households and 
ethnic minorities (World Bank, 2005: iii). For King and Mason, the unemployment crisis in 
Kosovo was linked to the limits of the liberal peace model promoted by the international 
community: people in Kosovo ‘needed more than a free market to find work; they needed 
employers, and these the international community could not create without reverting to socialist 
models’ (2006: 89). 
 
The Importance of Transfers for Kosovo’s Economy: Rentier Theory and Dutch Disease 
Even if we take at face value the statistics produced on Kosovo under the international 
administration, the so-called ‘economic expansion’ of post-war Kosovo described earlier 
depended overwhelmingly on transfers, specifically diaspora remittances and international 
assistance. During 2000–3, foreign assistance totalled € 4.1 billion, equivalent to over twice 
Kosovo’s 2003 GDP, and private inflows added another € 2.4 billion (Moalla-Fretini et al., 2005: 
5). According to what have been described as ‘very rough estimates’ undertaken by the 
Macroeconomic Policy Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, estimated total public 
expenditure in 2000 in Kosovo was € 6.3 billion and had fallen to € 3.1 billion in 2003. For the 
ESPIG, ‘the overall implications are clear: GDP growth in Kosovo’s economy was driven by 
external transfers, rather than from any lasting increase in the productivity of Kosovo’s 
enterprises’ (2004: 7). Moreover, in 2002, the Ministry of Finance and Economy estimated that, 
of Kosovo’s total income of € 1.57 billion, € 720 million came from cash remittances (Kosovo 
Government, 2003: 8). According to these figures, Kosovar households received more cash 
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income from relatives abroad than they did by working in Kosovo. This has helped mitigate 
consumption poverty, as previously indicated. Of course, it is also possible to see the glass half-
full. For Graciana del Castillo, for instance, ‘close to half the regular budget of $ 300 million for 
FY [fiscal year] 2000 was financed with domestic revenues’ (2008: 155). 
 
While keeping in mind the caveats outlined earlier on the politicized nature of the production of 
statistics in Kosovo, Table 1 below contains macroeconomic data drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators on Kosovo from 2006 onwards and seems to indicate that the 
Kosovar economy has characteristics of both a rentier economy and the Dutch disease. In 2006, 
for example, the total ‘rent’ from natural resources, aid and remittances reached a staggering 
34.44 per cent of GDP. There is also a huge trade deficit (imports greater than exports), with 
exports comprising mainly base metals rather than agricultural or manufactured goods, and with 
the share of services about two-thirds of the economy, all of which are classic symptoms of 
Dutch disease. Added to that, a recent IMF report (2013) indicates that the tax-to-GDP ratio in 
Kosovo of about 22 per cent was very favourable compared to neighbouring states, but with a 
very high reliance on trade taxes (and very low income tax collection), which will need to be 
relaxed after trade liberalization, making alternative sources of revenue more important. It is also 
important to factor in the adoption of the euro, which makes competitive devaluation impossible, 
despite the low-wage nature of the Kosovar economy. The biggest single factor contributing to 
the Dutch disease is the economy’s major reliance on emigration, and emigrant remittances: one 
in four households had at least one family member residing abroad, and would-be entrants to the 
labour market had an expectation to emigrate (World Bank, 2010).  
 
If the distortions created by the sudden inflow of aid and international workers in Kosovo at the 
height of international intervention in Kosovo (between 1999 and 2004, as discussed in the 
introduction) have been considered massive by scholars and practitioners, the absence of reliable 
economic information once again makes it hard to identify precisely the rent-seeking practices. 
Many different accounts reflect the same image of post-war Kosovo, with many Kosovars 
flocking to Pristina ‘looking for work or “investment opportunities”’, trebling Pristina’s 
population in three years (King and Mason, 2006: 132). Mark Baskin, who acted as Deputy 
Regional Administrator and Municipal Administrator in Prizren between 1999 and 2000, notes 
that ‘a significant portion of the labour force works for NGOs and international organisations’ 
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(2006: 83; see also Perritt, 2004: 276), either by being directly employed by the international 
institutions or through the informal economy generated by their presence. Mr Bajrami, head of 
the Chamber of Commerce, explains for instance that it pays better to sell chewing gum to UN 
staff than to toil in the fields (Zaremba, 2007a), while a cleaning lady working for the UN in 
Pristina earns three to four times more than a government minister (Ammitzboell, 2007: 76–7). A 
Kosovar judge could earn $5,000 a year in 2004 sitting with an international judge earning 
$140,000 (Villmoare, 2004: 38). Not only did the employment of local staff by international 
agencies create a salary disparity with other local public and private enterprises – with locals 
working with the international organizations earning four to five times more than their local 
colleagues who stayed within local institutions (Skendaj 2014: 15) – but it also led to growing 
tensions between local and international staff working for the same organization. Hence, from the 
very beginning, ‘wages paid by the international community as a whole created wage distortions 
that put serious pressure on budgetary decisions’ (del Castillo, 2008: 151). It created a ‘bubble 
economy’, where the influx of thousands of international employees provided a huge boost to the 
service economy – restaurants, bars and bootleg-CD sellers (King and Mason, 2006: 131), all 
consequences of external aid inflows and the presence of aid and reconstruction workers.17 The 
substantially different salary scales between internationals and locals were responsible for serious 
inflationary effects, especially on food and the real-estate market (Yannis, 2003: 178). The latter 
in particular suffered – with inflation induced by internationals flooding the territory providing 
opportunities for some, but a housing problem for many (King and Mason, 2006: 132). These 
major developmental challenges were exacerbated by the way international aid was invested. As 
noted by Major General Raul Cunha, Chief Military Liaison Officer of UNMIK, ‘[the] European 
Union has spent in Kosovo € 4,000 million, in different ways. From those 4,000 millions, 80 per 
cent was spent in capacity building and consultancy, which means that 3,200 millions went back 
to the base … that base has been made by two or three countries’ (Cunha, 2008; see also Melkert, 
2007; World Bank, 2011: 196).  
 
A World Bank report (2010) indicates a number of other constraints on economic growth in 
Kosovo, including energy shortages, a very high skilled-labour premium compared to 
                                                 
17 As one international official who was in Pristina in 2001 mentions, ‘the most poignant development in 
Kosovo was the boom economy. You could see from the beginning that a bust would follow’ (Villmoare, 
2004: 34). 
18 
 
neighbouring countries, and corruption and weak rule of law related to widespread rent-seeking. 
In this context, the solution according to the World Bank is to do more to attract export-oriented 
foreign direct investment. This opinion is supported by the fact that Kosovo’s economy has a 
large and structural trade deficit, which is a classic Dutch disease outcome (see Table 1). What is 
certain is that, with the level of foreign assistance dropping consistently, Kosovo seems ill-
prepared to face the challenge of economically sustainable growth. From € 1.271 billion in 2001 
(Moalla-Fetini et al., 2005: 65), the total of foreign assistance has steadily decreased to € 567.68 
million in 2012. Some analysts describe this situation as a process of the de-industrialization of 
Kosovo (EU/ESI 2002), emphasizing the Dutch disease analogy described earlier. While 
international donor assistance for Kosovo has gradually decreased, from 45 per cent of Kosovo’s 
general government revenues in 2004 to 27 per cent in 2010 (Republic of Kosovo, 2011: 6), 
remittances have been a more constant source of external financing, ranging between 11 and 16 
per cent of GDP (UNDP, 2012: 20). In the absence of a competitive export sector, the economy is 
still highly reliant upon the inflow of remittances (Korovilas, 2002). 
 
There is a general consensus that the main productive sectors that can feasibly be expanded are 
agriculture and the mining and metals sectors. As James Pettifer notes, subsistence agriculture 
has always been a cornerstone of Kosovo’s economy, and it is imperative that agriculture is 
revived as soon as possible to restore local food supplies, to help restore some elements of social 
stability, and to reduce Kosovo’s dependence on foreign aid (2002: 10). However, Kosovo’s 
agricultural model, attuned to the needs of subsistence agriculture by the extended family, 
conflicts with the neoliberal model, attuned to the free market and promoted by international 
actors such as the European Union.18 The same could be said of the unsatisfactory performance 
of Kosovo’s mining and metals sector, which is largely the consequence of the dominance of the 
neo-liberal policy paradigm promoted by international actors (Uberti, 2014b). Finally, the 
international architecture set up after 1999 cannot be completely detached from Kosovo’s socio-
economic system, deeply marked by the extractive industry since 1945 and the rent-seeking 
behaviour attached to it (Pettifer, 2002; Uberti, 2014a).  
 
                                                 
18 As a World Bank study argued, ‘in the long run it will be non-agricultural job creation which will 
determine economic development in the rural areas of Kosovo’ (1999: 2). 
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Conclusion 
Drawing insights from the economics and political economy of rentier theory, this article has 
highlighted certain structural limits of contemporary statebuilding operations by focusing on 
UNMIK in Kosovo. Understanding the interplay between economic and political reconstruction 
appears key in the context of Kosovo. In the absence of clear improvements in living standards 
and given the fact that UNMIK was in charge of Kosovo, the population logically attributed all 
setbacks to the UN administration. This article developed this theme by taking a fresh look at 
Kosovo’s economic growth data, with a specific focus on the socio-economic shortcomings that 
hindered Kosovo’s development in the post-war years. The post-conflict statebuilding project in 
Kosovo is inspired by the liberal peace paradigm, but this model as a modus operandi for 
statebuilding is not without its internal contradictions. Rentier statebuilding is one of these 
contradictions, where the end result is a state less accountable to its people, and less interested in 
or able to develop an internationally competitive productive base. The former phenomenon refers 
to the political economy aspect of rentierism, while the latter aspect pertains to an economic 
malaise (the Dutch disease) where the relative abundance of non-produced income from external 
flows crowds out production in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as agricultural 
and manufactured goods exports.  
 
In the case of Kosovo, the combined contribution of resource rents, aid and worker remittances 
from abroad have amounted to a third of national income. In the past, Kosovo has been able to 
extract a substantial geopolitical rent in the form of aid. Although the proportion of non-produced 
income is still very high, in recent years most of this is attributable to remittances received from 
Kosovars living abroad. However, Kosovo is not a classic oil-dependent rentier economy either, 
and aid flows are diminishing. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Kosovar state has not 
failed to harness resources through tax revenues. As indicated above, its domestic tax base is not 
insignificant, although heavily reliant on trade taxes, which will certainly diminish as the 
economy becomes more integrated via trade agreements with the rest of Europe.  
 
Critics of aid (Easterly, 2006: 30; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Surkhe et al., 2005) 
factor in many externalities – positive and negative – associated with international involvement in 
peacebuilding. Their view is that, on balance, aid does harm as solutions are imposed from the 
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outside, are not sui generis, and can even retard statebuilding buttressed on the mobilization of 
domestic resources. In this context, our aim here is not to belittle the achievements of the 
international community in Kosovo (which are numerous), but rather to shed light on the oft-
neglected theme of negative externalities of international interventions, which can take the form 
of rentier statebuilding in specific instances. The scholars who include aspects of political 
economy in their research focus generally on the need to design inclusive socio-economic 
policies to create the conditions for sustainable development in individual societies, without 
giving as much importance to possible negative externalities of international interventions on the 
local economy (Uberti et al., 2014). At the same time, traditional development economics (see, 
for instance, Sachs, 2005) has long considered foreign aid as a tool to ‘tackle multiple 
socioeconomic pathologies quickly and simultaneously’ (Abuzeid, 2009: 17), overlooking the 
potentially deleterious effects on the governments of the receiving countries. In that respect, 
rentier theory brings an additional level of complexity to the statebuilding and peacebuilding 
field, asserting that ‘it matters whether a state relies on taxes from extractive industries, 
agricultural production, foreign aid, remittances, or international borrowing because these 
different sources of revenues … have a powerful (and quite different) impact on the state’s 
institutional development’ (Karl, 1997: 34). Hence, it seems impossible – or implausible – to 
conceptually separate institution-building from its social moorings (Lemay-Hébert, 2009a). 
Critics of the liberal model are not confined to those who emphasize the negative impact of aid, 
or those who believe in giving war a chance following Tilly (1992; Luttwak, 1999), but also 
involve scholars who suggest a thorough re-examination of this model and of the alternative 
frameworks of peace. In this context, we agree with Michael Pugh that there is a distinct need to 
re-politicize economic issues in peacebuilding contexts (2005: 33). It is our hope that this study 
will contribute to the broader research agenda on the interplay between economic development 
and political settlement in peacebuilding contexts, which has started to attract more attention in 
the last few years (see, for instance, Berdal and Zaum, 2012; Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 
2013; Del Castillo, 2008; Pugh, 2005; Pugh et al., 2008).  
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 Table 1: Macroeconomic Data on Kosovo 
Indicator 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP at current price (in million 
US$) 
3918,2 4743,4 5771,5 5634,8 5750,8 6636,7 6445,2 
GDP per capita (current US$) 2278,62 2736,49 3302,92 3198,93 3238,65 3705,67 3566,59 
GDP growth rate (annual %) 3,4 8,3 7,2 3,0 3,2 4,5 2,7 
Agriculture as % of GDP  12,0 12,0 12,0 12,0 12,0 13,0 14,0 
Services as % of GDP 68,0 68,0 68,0 68,0 68,0 67,0 67,0 
Industry (mining, 
manufacturing and construction) 
as % of GDP 
20,0 20,0 20,0 - - - - 
Export as % of GDP 14,0 16,0 15,0 17,0 20,0 20,0 18,0 
Import as % of GDP 51,0 52,0 53,0 52,0 56,0 57,0 53,0 
Trade deficit as % of GDP  3,11 3,05 3,16 2,39 2,22 2,21 1,72 
Total natural resource rents (% 
of GDP) 
0,35 1,66 2,00 1,84 3,09 2,91 2,45 
Personal remittances received 
(% of GDP) 
19,67 19,37 18,06 18,73 17,34 16,90 16,43 
Net ODA received (% of GDP) - - - 13,87 10,78 9,90 8,81 
Total received from resource 
rent+ remittance+ ODA (% of 
GDP) 
   34,44 31,21 29,71 27,69 
General government final 
consumption (% of GDP) 
21,47 18,54 17,12 16,57 16,37 16,12 15,71 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
national poverty line (% of 
population)  
45.1 - - 34.5 29.2 29.7 - 
Source: Data collated from World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
